In response to widespread concern,' Congress in 1970 passed the Organized Crime Control Act (OCCA) to attack the problems arising from the growing influence of organized crime in America. 2 The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) chapter of OCCA (Title IX) 3 created a new substantive vehicle to reach racketeering activity and provided for both civil and criminal remedies, including criminal forfeiture. 4 In Russello v. United States , 5 the Supreme Court resolved a split of authority in the courts of appeals 6 by holding that profits and proceeds derived from racketeering activity constitute "interests" within the meaning of the RICO criminal forfeiture provision 7 and, therefore, are subject to forfeiture. 8 § 1963 . Criminal penalties (a) Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this chapter shall be fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both, and shall forfeit to the United States (1) any interest he has acquired or maintained in violation of section 1962, and (2) any interest in, security of, claim against, or property or contractual right of any kind affording a source of influence over, any enterprise which he has established [,] operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in violation of section 1962.
(b) In any action brought by the United States under this section, the district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to enter such restraining orders or prohibitions, or to take such other actions, including, but not limited to, the accept-The Court's expansive construction of RICO's forfeiture mechanism in Russello is consistent with both the ordinary meaning of "interest" in the statutory language, and the intent of Congress as reflected in RICO's legislative history. The Russello Court's approach preserves the effectiveness of RICO's forfeiture sanction while harmonizing the RICO statute's various parts. The decision will require lower courts to address a number of related issues involved in the application of the RICO forfeiture provision, such as what other types of property may constitute forfeitable "interests," the effect of greater potential criminal liability on existing procedural protections, the role of traditional restitutionary principles with respect to property subject to forfeiture, and the use of preconviction provisional equitable remedies. OnJune 8, 1977 , petitioner Joseph C. Russello and twenty-two others were indicted on charges of RICO conspiracy, RICO substantive violations, and mail fraud. 9 The eighty-three page, thirtyfive count indictment alleged the existence of a widespread arson insurance fraud scheme, specifying sixty-nine overt acts and fifty-six predicate acts of racketeering activity. 10 The ring allegedly involved an insurance adjuster, a money lender, a real estate broker, arson "torches," and property owners,"i and its activities allegedly reance of satisfactory performance bonds, in connection with any property or other interest subject to forfeiture under this section, as it shall deem proper.
II. FACTS
(c) Upon conviction of a person under this section, the court shall authorize the Attorney General to seize all property or other interest declared forfeited under this section upon such terms and conditions as the court shall deem proper. If a property right or other interest is not exercisable or transferable for value by the United States, it shall expire, and shall not revert to the convicted person. All provisions of law relating to the disposition of property, or the proceeds from the sale thereof, or the remission or mitigation of forfeitures for violation of the customs laws, and the compromise of claims and the award of compensation to informers in respect of such forfeitures shall apply to forfeitures incurred, or alleged to have been incurred, under the provisions of this section, insofar as applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions hereof. Such duties as are imposed upon the collector of customs or any other person with respect to the disposition of property under the customs laws shall be performed under this chapter by the Attorney General. The United States shall dispose of all such property as soon as commercially feasible, making due provision for the rights of innocent persons. 18 U.S. C. § 1963 (1982) .
8 104 S. Ct. at 300. 9 United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367, 378 (5th Cir. 1981) , cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2020 (1982 ), vacated in part, 681 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1982 ) (en banc) (vacating only as to forfeiture issue), aff'd sub nom. Russello v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 296 (1983) . See also Joint Appendix at 5-50, Russello (indictment redacted to counts relating to defendant Russello) [hereinafter cited as Joint Appendix, Indictment]. 10 Martino, 648 F.2d at 378-79. 11 Joint Appendix, Indictment, supra note 9, at 9-12.
[Vol. 75 sulted in the destruction of at least eighteen residential and commercial properties in Tampa and Miami, Florida during a three-year period.' 2 After a fifty-two day trial in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, and after twenty days of deliberation,1 3 a jury brought back a total of eighty convictions against Petitioner and fifteen of his co-defendants.' 4 Petitioner Russello was convicted of conspiracy to commit RICO violations, 1 5 participation in RICO violations, 16 and mail 12 Martino, 681 F.2d at 953. For a detailed description of the properties and their respective roles in the alleged arson scheme, see Joint Appendix, Indictment, supra note 9, at 13-26.
13 Joint Appendix at 1-4, Russello (docket entries). The complexity of the case also is reflected in the supplemental record at the appellate court level, which included eight volumes of pleadings, five boxes of exhibits, and the testimony of over two hundred witnesses contained in nearly one hundred volumes, comprising over 11,000 pages of material. Martino, 648 F.2d at 379. The Supreme Court, in turn, received four boxes of materials containing the certified original record and appellate court proceedings. Docket Sheet in the Supreme Court, entry no. 13 (Mar. 31, 1983) , Russello. 14 Martino, 648 F.2d at 378. Three other defendants pleaded guilty. Id. The jury found four defendants not guilty. Id. 15 RICO conspiracy is declared unlawful in 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1982) . Section 1962 as a whole provides: § 1962. Prohibited activities (a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. A purchase of securities on the open market for the purposes of investment, and without the intention of controlling or participating in the control of the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the securities of the issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his or their accomplices in any pattern or [sic: of] racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt after such purchase do not amount in the aggregate to one percent of the outstanding securities of any one class, and do not confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect one or more directors of the issuer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section. 18 U.S. C. § 1962 (1982) . The lower court discussed the requirements for a RICO conspiracy conviction:
To convict on a charge of conspiracy, the government must prove that the defendant had knowledge of the conspiracy and that he intended to join in the objectives of the conspiracy. The degree of criminal intent necessary for participation in a conspiracy must be at least equal to that required for the substantive offense itself. . . . More specifically, to convict for conspiracy to violate RICO the govern-ment must prove that the person objectively manifested, through words or actions, an agreement to participate in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise through the commission of two or more predicate crimes. Martino, 648 F.2d at 394 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). At least one commentator has criticized this formulation of RICO's conspiracy requirements and Martino 's language in particular. See Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237, 296 n.151 (1982) . Professor Blakey was Chief Counsel of the Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the United States Senate in 1969-70, when the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 was processed; he takes issue with Martino's interjection of a "two personal act" rule into the RICO conspiracy framework. Id. at 296-97 n.151. He claims that such a rule is not justified by reference to the text of RICO or its legislative history and runs counter to general principles of conspiratorial liability and the goals of RICO. Id. The two personal act rule requires that a person agree to participate in at least two predicate acts in order to be held liable on RICO conspiracy grounds. Id. Circuits that have adopted this rule have expressed concern over the possible "guilt by association" implications of a lesser standard. See, e.g., United States v. Winter, 663 F.2d 1120 , 1136 (1st Cir. 1981 . Professor Blakey contends that "[t]he defendant's role in the enterprise, not specific individual offenses he agrees to commit, ought to suffice for RICO liability." Blakey, supra, at 297 n.151 (citation omitted).
Although Congress' main targets in enacting RICO were members of organized crime, see infra note 168, legislation attacking "organized crime" required a focus on specific illegal conduct perpetrated by such members, i.e., the commission of two or more crimes that form a pattern of racketeering activity, and not simply their status as known "organized criminals." See Weiner, Crime Must Not Pay: RICO Criminal Forfeiture in Perspective, 1981 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 225, 228 n.13. Cf. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962 (state cannot constitutionally punish mere status of being a drug addict). RICO therefore introduced several new concepts to the criminal law. See infra note 124 and accompanying text. RICO's definitional section clarifies some of its key terms:
§ 1961. Definitions As used in this chapter-(1) "racketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18, United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to sports bribery), sections 471, 472, and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from interstate shipment) if the act indictable under section 659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), sections 891-894 (relating to extortionate credit transactions), section 1084 (relating to the transmission of gambling information), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), section 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or local law enforcement), section 1951 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952 (relating to racketeering), section 1953 (relating to interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to unlawful welfare fund payments), section 1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal gambling businesses), sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen property), sections 2341-2346 (relating to trafficking in contraband cigarettes), sections 2421-24 (relating to white slave traffic), (C) any act which is indictable under title 29, United States Code, section 186 (dealing with restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations) or section 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union funds), or (D) any offense involving fraud connected with a case under title 11, fraud in the sale of securities, or the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under any law of the United States; fraud. 17 Russello had owned and insured the Central Professional Building in Tampa, Florida before the advent of the arson ring. 1 8 He later arranged for two arsonists to set fire to the front portion of his building, intending to use the proceeds to rebuild that section, which was less profitable than the newer rear portion of the build-(3) "person" includes any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property; (4) "enterprise" includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity;
(5) "pattern of racketeering activity" requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity; 18 U.S. C. § 1961 (1982) . One key definition not included in RICO, the absence of which in part generated the case that is the subject of this Note, is that of "interest. " See Russello, 104 S. Ct. at 299. 16 Specifically, Russello was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982) . For the text of Secton 1962, see supra note 15. The panel opinion at the court of appeals level identified the essential components for a conviction under Section 1962(c):
Five necessary elements comprise a substantive RICO charge. The government must prove (1) the existence of the enterprise; (2) that the enterprise affected interstate commerce; (3) that the defendant was employed by or associated with the enterprise; (4) that he participated in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise; and (5) that he participated through a pattern of racketeering activity. Martino, 648 F.2d at 394. The "enterprise" in Russello was characterized as an "associated in fact" enterprise as defined in Section 1961(4). 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1982) . See supra note 15 ( § 1961 text) . The Supreme Court, in a later case, legitimized such an interpretation of RICO's "enterprise" language. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981) (holding that the term "enterprise" as used in RICO encompasses both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises). The "patterns of racketeering activity" that arise under RICO "may be grouped into four, broad, but not mutually exclusive categories: (1) violence; (2) provision of illegal goods and services; (3) corruption in the labor movement or among public officials; and (4) commercial and other forms of fraud." Blakey, supra note 15, at 300-06 (footnotes omitted).
17 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982) . Section 1341 provides in pertinent part: Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises . . . for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail according to the direction thereon . . . shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. Id. In simple terms, "'[t]he two basic elements of a mail fraud scheme are (1) the scheme to defraud, and (2) causing a mailing for the purpose of executing the scheme.' " Martino, 648 F.2d at 394 (quoting United States v. Green, 494 F.2d 820, 823 (5th Cir.) , cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1004 (1974) ).
18 Brief for Petitioner at 4, Russello. Russello had obtained fire insurance in the amount of $925,000 on the building and $7500 on the contents. Joint Appendix, Indictment, supra note 9, at 48. Upon submission to the jury of a special verdict regarding the extent of the interest subject to forfeiture, 2 2 the jury found insurance money received by four defendants in various insurance fraud schemes, including the proceeds received by Russello, to be subject to forfeiture to the government. 23 The trial court subsequently issued an order of forfeiture as to the four defendants, 24 and meted out other penalties. 25 Russello appealed. States, Feb. 28, 1978) . The government had sought the forfeiture of a total of $508,492.69, consisting of nineteen insurance payments from the various defendants under RICO's criminal forfeiture provision. Joint Appendix, Indictment, supra note 9, at 37-47.
24 Joint Appendix at 58-60, Russello (Order and Judgment of Forfeiture, Nov. 17, 1978) . The government initially had sought to have Russello's ownership interest and property rights in both the corporation and the real property involved in the violations forfeited as "source[s] of influence" over the RICO enterprise ( § 1963(a) (2)), in addition to seeking forfeiture of the insurance proceeds. Joint Appendix, Indictment, supra note 9, at 46. The trial court, however, granted an acquittal as to the forfeiture of Russello's interests in the corporation and the real property. Brief for Petitioner at 28, Russello.
25 Martino, 648 F.2d at 379 n.1 (setting out sentences for various defendants). The trial court sentenced Russello to a total of two ten-year terms for the RICO violations ( § 1962(d) conspiracy and § 1962(c) substantive) and a total of two five-year terms for the mail fraud violations (two), all to run concurrently. Id.; Joint Appendix at 51-53, Russello (Judgment and Probation/Commitment Order, Apr. 7, 1978) .
26 Joint Appendix at 61, Russello (Notice of Appeal, Nov. 27, 1978) . 27 This court has since become a part of the new United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. See Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980 , Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat. 1994 (1980 ) (effective date Oct. 1, 1981 .
28 United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367, 406 (5th Cir. 1981) Supp. 456 (W.D. Pa. 1977) . The district court in Meyers denied a motion to quash an entire indictment because although the government had failed to specify the extent of the interest or property subject to forfeiture as required by Rule 7(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, there were no longer any properly forfeitable interests still in existence because the government had conceded that the evidence did not establish any participation in the enterprise by the defendant for at least five years' time. Id. at 461. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(2) ("When an offense charged may result in a criminal forfeiture, the indictment ... shall allege the extent of the interest or property subject to forfeiture.").
The Meyers court discussed the definition of "interest" under § 1963, explaining that "the more natural interpretation is that an 'interest' is akin to a continuing proprietary right in the nature of partnership or stock ownership (or holding a debt or claim, as distinguished from 'equity' investment) rather than mere dividends or distributed prof- Godoy, 678 F.2d 84 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that commercial real estate purchased with profits derived from racketeering activity is subject to forfeiture), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 390 (1983) . Interestingly, the third judge on the Marubeni panel, a district judge from the Eastern District of Virginia sitting by designation, also later participated in the Seventh Circuit's three-judge panel opinion in United States v. McManigal, 708 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1983) , which expressly rejected the en banc Fifth Circuit's decision in Martino in favor of Marubeni's reasoning. See Marubeni, 611 F.2d at 763; McManigal, 708 F.2d at 278. The Ninth Circuit in Marubeni, although characterizing the government's position regarding forfeiture as "attractive," concluded that such an interpretation did "not square with the statute Congress wrote." 611 F.2d at 766. The government in its memorandum response to Russello's petition for certiorari pointed out that although it had not been relied upon by the en banc Martino court, there was a factual distinction between Marubeni and Martino: although the interest sought to be forfeited in Marubeni involved all monies received under a public contract obtained through bid-rigging, including both profits and actual costs of goods and services furnished under that contract, the insurance proceeds forfeited in Martino consisted solely of profit from arson and fraud. Memorandum for the United States at 4 n. The full Fifth Circuit, by a vote of 16-7, affirmed the forfeiture judgment entered by the district court.
3 9 In reasoning similar to that later employed by the Supreme Court, the en banc appellate court looked initially to the language of the statute itself. 40 The court of appeals noted that Section 1963(a)(1) does not on its face limit forfeitable interests to those in an enterprise, and that RICO offers no definition of the term "interest." 41 The court then examined the operation and interrelation of RICO's various parts, 4 2 concluding, inter alia, that to read an "enterprise" limitation into Section 1963 (a) (1) would render it mere surplusage and duplicative of Section 1963(a)(2).
43
The court next explored RICO's legislative history. The en in ren forfeiture, as well as a discussion of the significance of RICO's revival of in personam forfeiture, see infra notes 131-37 and accompanying text. The court noted that such in personam forfeitures had previously been prohibited by 18 U.S. C. § 3563 (1982) , and pointed to comments supporting limitation of forfeiture to interests in an enterprise contained in a letter by Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindienst during legislative hearings on a predecessor bill. Joint Appendix, Martino panel opinion on forfeiture, supra note 29, at 66-67. For a discussion of the import of the Kleindienst letter, see infra notes 111-13 and accompanying text. The court also found significant Congress' use of the more specific term "profits" in a contemporary bill's forfeiture provision. banc opinion emphasized that Congress had been concerned with the economic influence wielded by organized crime by virtue of its ill-gotten gains. 4 4 The Fifth Circuit characterized RICO's forfeiture provision as a "two-pronged attack on the sources of economic power which feed the coffers and activities of organized crime... demand[ing] both divestiture of power over the enterprise itself and seizure of the income derived from racketeering activities." '4 5 The en banc court also took notice, as did the panel opinion, of the problems presented by associations in fact, which often have nothing to forfeit but ill-gotten proceeds. 4 6 The court found it persuasive that the two-part forfeiture provision embodied in Section 1963(a), which contains a provision (Section 1963(a)(1)) that is not by its language limited to interests "in an enterprise" and another (Section 1963(a) (2)) that is so limited, developed from a single forfeiture provision that had been limited to interests in the enterprise. 47 Finally, the Fifth Circuit opinion, recognizing that its holding "squarely conflict [ed] 50 681 F.2d at 960-61. Although the en banc appellate court returned the case to the district court for a decision on the collectibility of forfeiture orders in the first instance, the court of appeals observed that commentators had suggested application of traditional restitution principles in such a case. Id. at 961.
51 Id. at 962 (Politz, J., dissenting). See supra notes 27-37 and accompanying text. Initially, the dissenting opinion objected to the majority's framing of the issue before the court, noting that "perhaps the more precise issue at bar" was whether under RICO's criminal forfeiture scheme, "a moneyjudgment may be rendered against a defendant, in a sum equal to the amount paid under a fire insurance policy, for a loss occasioned by arson in a setting violative of RICO." 681 F.2d at 962 (Politz, J., dissenting). Judge Politz asserted at the outset that society's abhorrence of forfeitures, especially in personam forfeitures, required that such provisions be "most charily assessed." Id. The dissent counseled against expanding the term "interest" to include income or profits, stating that such an expansion is "a matter best left to the legislative branch, for it represents a significant policy decision." Id. Judge Politz viewed the decisions in Marubeni, Thevis, and Meyers as persuasive and reiterated a number of his panel opinion justifications. Id. at 963-65 (Politz, J., dissenting). Further, the opinion, assuming arguendo that insurance proceeds were properly forfeitable, raised a question as to the propriety of applying the forfeiture sanction to Russello and one other defendant. Id. at 965 (Politz, J., dissenting). Judge Politz explained that inasmuch as the insurance policies had been obtained prior to the advent of the RICO arson ring, the insurance proceeds might be viewed as a "different manifestation of a pre-RICO asset," and therefore not necessarily the "fruits" of racketeering activity. Id. Finally, the dissent identified a number of practical difficulties inherent in the majority's holding:
Regardless, these proceeds, based on arson and the payments of which were induced by fraud, are very likely to be defeasible. One would expect that under the insurance contract, and controlling state law, the insurer would be entitled to recapture the payments. In that event, what happens to the forfeiture decrees which are non-asset oriented money judgments, collectible from the defendants and their estates? Assuming recapture by the insurer, or diversion of all or a portion to an innocent third party such as a mortgage holder, will the United States still have an enforceable money judgment against the defendant and his estate? Presumably so, and if that presumption is correct, what about the concept of divestiture of ill-gotten gains and the separation of the convicted defendant from the fruits of his illegal labors? Will this matter not in fact resolve into the forfeiture becoming an additional fine? Did Congress really intend to establish a latent fine with a potential for exceeding the maximum statutorily stated fine ten-fold, twenty-fold or one hundred-fold? Id. 52 Russello v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 721 (1983) (grant of certiorari). Certiorari was granted on January 10, 1983. Petitioner Russello asserted that a writ of certiorari was justified because, inter alia, as the Martino decision conflicted with a string of other gument 5 3 on the question of whether the term "interest" as used in Section 1963 (a)(1) includes income or profits derived from a pattern of racketeering activity.
4 III. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
The Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Blackmun for a unanimous Court, affirmed the judgment of the en banc Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 55 The Court held that profits and proceeds derived from racketeering activity constitute "interests" within the meaning of Section 1963(a)(1) and are therefore subject to forfeiture.
56
Characterizing the litigation as "yet another case" concerning RICO, 5 7 the Court initially framed its task as one of "interpretation" 54 Petition for Certiorari, supra note 52, at i (framing question presented). The petitioner viewed the issue as a "purely legal question" independent of the facts elicited at trial. Id. at 5. The government regarded the issue as focused on the forfeiture of "uninvested" profits of racketeering activity, thereby distinguishing it from the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Godoy, 678 F.2d 84 (9th Cir. 1982 ) (holding that commercial real estate purchased with profits derived from racketeering activity is subject to forfeiture), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 390 (1983) . Memorandum for the United States at 5 & n.4, Russello.
55 Russello v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 296, 304 (1983) , aff'g United States v. Martino, 681 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1982) .
56 Id. at 300. The Court did, however, allude to possible limits on its decision: In our ruling today, we recognize that we have not resolved any ambiguity that might be inherent in the terms "profits" and "proceeds." Our use of those terms is not intended to suggest a particular means of calculating the precise amount that is subject to RICO forfeiture in any given case. We hold simply that the "interests" subject to forfeiture under § 1963(a)(1) are not limited to interests in an enterprise. Id. at 304 n.3.
57 Id. at 297. For example, the Court had only two years before broadly interpreted another key term in RICO, "enterprise," to encompass illegitimate enterprises, such as a series of criminal acts unrelated to a legitimate business operation, as well as legitimate enterprises, thereby resolving a split in the circuits similar to that encountered in Russello and eschewing a substantially more restricted reading of the RICO statute. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981 ), rev'g 632 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1980 The Russello Court, drawing on its earlier decision in United States v. Turkette , 62 in which the Court had interpreted the term "enterprise," began its analysis with the language of the statute: " 'In determining the scope of a statute, we look first to its language. If the statutory language is unambiguous, in the absence of "a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive."' ". 63 In the instant case, Justice Blackmun wrote for the Court that Russello "definitely" had "acquired" the insurance proceeds "in violation of section 1962," specifically Section 1962(c). 64 If the insurance monies qualified as an "interest," therefore, they would be forfeitable. 6 5 Finding no specific definition of the term "interest" in RICO, the opinion looked to the "ordinary meaning" of the word. 66 The Court pointed to several dictionary definitions of "interest" and suggested that those definitions lead to the conclusion that the "ordinary meaning of 'interest' surely encompasses a right to profits or proceeds." 67 The Court concluded: "It is thus apparent that the term 'interest' comprehends all forms of real and personal property, including profits and proceeds."
68
The Court analogized its approach in defining the term "interest" to its previous efforts to define "property" interest for purposes of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 69 Reasoning that Congress undoubtedly did not wish its language in RICO to be limited by "rigid and technical definitions drawn from other areas of the law," ' 70 the opinion observed that Congress had opted to use terms of breadth such as "enterprise," "racketeering activity," and "participate," as well as "interest." 71 Justice Blackmun added that Petitioner himself had not attempted to define the term "interest."
72
Petitioner Russello argued that a relationship exists between what is subject to forfeiture as a result of racketeering activity and what constitutes such racketeering activity. 73 Russello contended that because an "interest" connotes at the least an interest in "something," Section 1962's listing of RICO violations, and its "enterprise" requirement in particular, should be read as delineating the scope of that "something" and, therefore, as imposing upon Section 1963 the requirement that the "interest" be in an enter-66 Id. (quoting Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962) ("start with the assumption that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used")).
67 Id. The Court cited definitions appearing in WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNA-TIONAL DICTIONARY 1178 (1976) ("interest" includes, inter alia, a "good," "benefit," or "profit"); RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1979) (includes "profit." "welfare," or "benefit"); and BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 729 (5th ed. 1979) ("most general term that can be employed to denote a right, claim, title or legal share in something"). 104 S. Ct. at 299. 68 104 S. Ct. at 299.
69 Id. The Court noted that "property" denotes a broad range of interests.'" Id.
(quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972) ). The Court also cited Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430 (1982) , and Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14, 17-18 (1981 prise. 74 The Supreme Court rejected this tack, one that had been adopted by a number of lower courts, 75 and noted that every property interest could be described as an interest in something, even if only a "possessory interest in currency." ' 7 6 Thus, the Court believed that it was unnecessary to define the "something" in which a RICO forfeitable interest is held as the RICO "enterprise."
Having concluded that the statutory language of Section 1963(a)(1) "plainly covers" Russello's insurance proceeds, the Supreme Court drew support for its finding from RICO's structure. 77 The opinion pointed out that other parts of the RICO statute contain less expansive language than that appearing in Section 1963(a)(1), such as Section 1963(a)(2)'s "interest in. . . any enterprise" phraseology, and that this difference should be presumed intentional: "'[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.' ",78 Justice Blackmun opined that had it so intended, Congress would have expressly restricted Section 1963(a)(1) to interests in an enterprise as it had restricted (a)(2). 7 9 Justice Blackmun refused "to ascribe this difference to a simple mistake in draftsmanship." 8 0
The Court next examined the relationship between Sections 1963(a)(1) and (a)(2). Justice Blackmun's opinion first noted that the present two-part forfeiture provision, with only one of the subsections limited on its face to interests "in any enterprise," evolved from a unitary provision that had limited forfeiture to "all interest in the enterprise." 8 ' The Court explained that " [w] here Congress includes limiting language in an earlier version of a bill but deletes it prior to enactment, it may be presumed that the limitation was not intended. ' 8 2 The Court's opinion rejected the reasoning of some lower courts that had found the existence of Subsection (a)(2) to preclude a broad interpretation of "interest" in (a)(1), and contended that an expansive construction, althugh admittedly allowing Respondent United States posited the same theory to explain the difference between subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2), arguing that a forfeitable interest under subsection (a)(2) need not be "illegally acquired or maintained." Brief for the United States at 23, Russello. As an illustration, the government hypothesized a "defendant lawfully acquir [ing] an interest in an enterprise and then conduct [ing] or participat [ing] in the conduct of the enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity," and concluded that "his interest in the enterprise would be subject to forfeiture under subsection (a)(2) but not under (a)(1)." Id. The government offered no further explanation with regard to this example as to why (a)(1) would not apply.
It is not clear, however, that this fact pattern would not be reachable via § 1963(a)(1)'s forfeiture mechanism. Query whether a person, taking part in illegal racketeering conduct as part of an enterprise in which he has an interest, would not also be illegally "maintain [ing] " that interest, even though the interest was legally acquired, once the enterprise embarked on a pattern of racketeering activity? To be more specific, would not the defendant have "maintained" his interest "in violation of section 1962"; in particular violating § 1962(c)'s proscription of conducting or participating in an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity; maintaining his interest through a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of § 1962(b); or violating § 1962(d)'s proscription against conspiring to violate § 1962(a), (b), or (c)? If so, such interest would seem on the face of § 1963(a)(1) to be forfeitable under its "maintained in violation" language. RICO offers no specific definition of the term "maintained," but "maintained" in (a)(1) seemingly means something other than "acquired," and arguably could have been inserted by RICO's drafters precisely to catch those situations in which an interest was legitimately acquired but later illegally "maintained," as where that interest is put to a corrupt use. Indeed, if not this one, what other scenario would the "maintained" language in (a)(1) be designed to reach?
Another problem with the Court's, and the government's, interpretation is that it is also unclear exactly what meaning is to be ascribed to the phrase "in violation of section 1962." In what manner and to what extent, for instance, must the interest that is "maintained" be related to the activity declared unlawful by § 1962 in order to be "maintained in violation of" that section? For that matter, one could raise the same question as to what comprises the requisite relationship where an interest is found to be "acquired... in violation of section 1962."
Note that the Supreme Court in Russello, unlike the government in its brief, neglected to include the phrase "or maintained" in its formulation of the distinction between (a) (1) and (a) (2): "Subsection (a) (2), on the other hand, is restricted to an interest in an enterprise, but that interest itself need not have been illegally acquired." 104 S. Ct. at 301 (emphasis supplied). Indeed, when quoting § 1963(a)(1) at that point, the Court, for no apparent reason, deleted the phrase "or maintained" from the statutory language. See id. These omissions may very well be attributable to the fact that Russello's facts involved an illegal acquiring (insurance proceeds) and not an illegal maintaining. Perhaps the omissions also were just that, unintentional oversights. On the other hand, perhaps they reveal the Supreme Court's caution in attempting to state the precise rela-served further, as had the lower court, 8 5 that a narrow interpretation "would blunt the effectiveness of the [forfeiture] provision in combatting illegitimate enterprises," such as the instant arson ring, given that such associations in fact rarely possess interests of a forfeitable nature independent of their members. 8 6 The Russello Court eschewed placing "'[w]hole areas of organized criminal activity'" beyond the reach of RICO forfeiture.
7
The Supreme Court dismissed a number of arguments that had been raised by some lower courts and by petitioner Russello. Justice Blackmun's opinion rejected Petitioner's contention that Congress' use of the more specific term "profits" in the forfeiture mechanism of the Controlled Substances Act, passed within a month of RICO, indicated that RICO's broader language was not meant to reach profits. 8 8 The Court observed that RICO is targeted tionship between (a)(1) and (a)(2) in light of the expanded scope given to (a)(1) by the Court. In oral argument, for example, at least one Justice manifested a concern with the relationship between § 1963(a) (1) and (a)(2) 4038, 4039 (Oct. 12, 1983 ) (emphasis supplied) (ellipsis in original). In this exchange, government counsel retreated to the unlawful acquisition element, variously characterized as an illegal "obtain[ing]," as the distinguishing factor in his hypothetical, which is essentially the same example relied upon in the government's brief. He did not address, however, why the interest described would not have been illegally "maintained," although he acknowledged initially that the term "maintained" also appears in § 1963(a)(1) (which, incidentally, reads "acquired or maintained," and not, as framed by the Assistant to the Solicitor General, "acquired and maintained"). The answer to Justice O'Connor's initial query seems, therefore, somewhat opaque. In any case, given, inter alia, Justice O'Connor's obvious concerns, it seems odd that the Court characterized as "plainly incorrect" the argument that Subsection (a)(2) may be rendered redundant by a broad interpretation of (a)(1 at more economically diverse criminal activity than is the drug legislation, which is aimed at illegal operations generating primarily monetary profits. 8 9 The opinion also interpreted later attempts by some Congressmen to amend and clarify RICO's forfeiture provision, not as indicative of the limited scope of RICO's language as written, but as a reaction by some members of Congress to narrow readings of Section 1963(a)(1) adopted by several lower courts. 90 Similarly, the Supreme Court attributed the presence of specific "profits" and "proceeds" language in later state RICO-type legislation to an effort by those states to avoid in their courts the narrow readings of RICO engaged in by earlier lower federal court decisions, rather than to a deficiency in RICO's forfeiture language. 9 ' The Supreme Court also utilized RICO's legislative history as further justification for an expansive interpretation of RICO's forfeiture provision. The Court drew on Congress' Statement of Findings and Purpose as evidence that "the RICO statute was intended to provide new weapons of unprecedented scope for an assault upon organized crime and its economic roots." 9 2 Also of signifilanguage in another statute, even when the two are enacted at or about the same time. The term "profits" is specific; the term "interest" is general. The use of the specific in the one statute cannot fairly be read as imposing a limitation upon the general provision in the other statute. Id. 89 Id. The opinion explained that although Congress was clearly aware of the differing terminology employed in the two forfeiture provisions, id. at 301-02, it was most unlikely. . . that without explanation a potent forfeiture weapon was withheld from the RICO statute, intended for use in a broad assault on organized crime, while the same weapon was included in the Controlled Substances Act, meant for use in only one part of the same struggle. The Congress finds that (1) organized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from America's economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud, and corruption; (2) organized crime derives a major portion of its power through money obtained from such illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan sharking, the theft and fencing of property, the importation and distribution of narcotics and other dangerous drugs, and other forms of social exploitation; (3) this money and power are increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business and labor unions and to subvert and corrupt our democratic processes; (4) organized crime activities in the United States weaken the stability of the Nation's economic system, harm innocent investors and competing organizations, interfere with cance, from the Court's perspective, was RICO's "liberal construction" clause: "The provisions of this title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes." 9 3 The opinion cited a number of statements from RICO's drafters emphasizing organized crime's illegal income and economic clout as the focus of an effective attack.
94
The Russello Court discounted contrary readings of RICO's legislative history espoused by some lower courts. Although recognizing that one of Congress' primary concerns was organized crime's infiltration of legitimate business, Justice Blackmun's opinion disagreed that the scope of RICO's forfeiture provision should be limited to fulfillment of only this one legislative purpose. 9 5 The opinion reasoned that Congress' "broader goal" was to take the profit out of organized crime by forcing the racketeer to disgorge his ill-gotten gains; indeed, to fail to reach profits and proceeds would only encourage "speedy looting of an infiltrated company."
96
Put simply, a forfeiture provision reaching only "an interest of little worth in a bankrupt shell," 9 7 and not illegal profits already removed from an enterprise by its racketeer constituents, would create an incentive to quickly bleed as many proceeds from the enterprise as possible. On grounds resembling those put forth by the en banc free competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign commerce, threaten the domestic security, and undermine the general welfare of the Nation and its citizens; and (5) organized crime continues to grow because of defects in the evidence-gathering process of the law inhibiting the development of the legally admissible evidence necessary to bring criminal and other sanctions and remedies to bear on the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime and because the sanctions and remedies available to the Government are unnecessarily limited in scope and impact.
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime. Pub. L. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970) 
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SUPREME COURT REVIEW
Fifth Circuit in Martino, the Supreme Court also denied interpretive weight to a letter by then Deputy Attorney General Kleindienst addressing the constitutionality of an early forfeiture draft. 98 Finally, on the grounds that the language of RICO's forfeiture provision was clear, the Russello Court found inapplicable the rule of lenity, an interpretive aid sometimes relied upon in cases of statutory ambiguity, which calls for strict construction of penal provisions. 9 9
In conclusion, the Russello Court expressly declared its disagreement with the reasoning of the Marubeni, McManigal, Meyers, and Thevis courts and affirmed the Fifth Circuit's en banc judgment in Martino. 100
IV. ANALYSIS
The sharp division in the lower federal courts regarding the propriety of forfeiture of profits and proceeds under RICO's Section 1963(a)(1), as well as the Supreme Court's resolution of the issue in Russello, provide an opportunity to examine conflicting approaches to application of the congressional mandate embodied in RICO. This Section discusses the various attempts to define RICO's terms; the question of whether RICO should be read broadly or narrowly; RICO's structural congruity; congressional intent and RICO's legislative history; and potential questions in the application of the RICO forfeiture mechanism.
A.
ATTEMPTING TO DEFINE A RICO "INTEREST"
As the Supreme Court noted at the outset of its Russello opinion, the question of whether Section 1963(a)(1) reaches profits and proceeds of racketeering activity is essentially one of "interpretation." 1 0 ' The single goal of statutory interpretation ostensibly is the ascertaining by the reviewing court of the intended meaning of language used by a legislature. Nevertheless, the process of statutory interpretation can produce diverse results, entailing significant consequences. 1 02 98 Id. See supra note 47. 99 104 S. Ct. at 303-04. The opinion noted that the rule of lenity " 'comes into operation at the end of the process of construing what Congress has expressed, not at the beginning as an overriding consideration of being lenient to wrong-doers.' " Id. at 303 (quoting Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 596 (1961) ). Cf. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 588 n. 10 ("There being no ambiguity in the RICO provisions at issue here, the rule of lenity does not come into play.") (citation omitted The interpretation issue raised by RICO's forfeiture language to some degree presents the courts with questions of both ambiguity and vagueness. A statute may be unconstitutionally vague, see Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (statute is unconstitutional where it is so vague "that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning"), and in particular that vagueness may go to the sanction to be imposed, see United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 435 (1948) . Ambiguity, however, "exists when it is in fact possible to ascertain one or more alternative meanings. Vagueness, therefore, means 'no meaning,' while ambiguity means 'more than one meaning.'" Blakey, supra note 15, at 289 n.150.
103 See, e.g., Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 429-31 & n.8 (1981) 770, 786-89 (1975) . In the specific context of RICO, the Supreme Court has expounded at length on a court's proper approach to interpretation:
In determining the scope of a statute, we look first to its language. If the statutory language is unambiguous, in the absence of "a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive." Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980). Of course, there is no errorless test for identifying or recognizing "plain" or "unambiguous" language. Also, authoritative administrative constructions should be given the deference to which they are entitled, absurd results are to be avoided and internal inconsistencies in the statute must be dealt with. Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases, 436 U.S. 631, 643 (1978); Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 571 (1965) . We nevertheless begin with the language of the statute. § 1963 (1982) . At the same time, neither does § 1963(a)(1) by its terms expressly include profits or proceeds.
word "interest" in sections other than 1963(a)(1), express language limits the term to interests "in any enterprise." 10 5 Unless one considers the omission of limiting language in Section 1963(a)(1) to have been purposeful, no reason, other than a simple mistake in drafting, seems to exist to explain the dissimilar phrasing. 1 0 6 The Russello Court, rightly it appears, refused to attribute the differing language to mistake, but presumed the omission to be intentional. 1 0 7
105 See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(2) (authorizing forfeiture of "any interest in . . .any enterprise"); § 1962(b) (making it unlawful through a pattern of racketeering activity to acquire or maintain "any interest in . ..any enterprise"); § 1964(a) (conferring jurisdiction on district courts to divest defendant of "any interest, direct or indirect, in any enterprise").
106 This argument was espoused by the government in Russello. See Brief for the United States at 21-22, Russello.
It might be possible to base an argument against inclusion of proceeds in (a) (1) on an ejusdem generis type of analysis. Ejusdm generis is a principle of statutory construction suggesting that more general terms in a series are limited, by more specific words in that series, to things similar to those specifically enumerated. 2A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.17 (4th ed. 1973). Strictly speaking, this principle does not fully apply in the context of RICO's forfeiture section because that section does not involve words in a series, but rather involves phrases within a single provision. Nevertheless, the argument might be advanced that despite the omission in (a)(1)-the more general phrase-of the words "in any enterprise," the presence of those words in (a)(2)-the more specific phrase-impels a restricted, more specific reading of (a)(1) as well.
The contention, however, does not seem persuasive. Initially, § 1963(a) is not a series; it contains only two parts, each presumably having an equal role in the statutory forfeiture scheme. Moreover, the ejusdem generis approach is at odds with the Supreme Court's reasoning in Turkette. In Turkette, the First Circuit had relied on e'usdem generis to restrict the term "enterprise" to mean "legitimate enterprise." See United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896, 899 (1st Cir. 1980 ), rev'd, 452 U.S. 576 (1981 . The court of appeals reasoned that because each of the specific enterprises enumerated in § 1961(4) was a legitimate enterprise, the final phrase, "any union or group of individuals associated in fact," also should be limited to legitimate enterprises. Id. ; see supra note 15 (text § 1961) . The Supreme Court, however, explicitly rejected this view. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 581 (1981). The Turkette Court characterized the rule of ejusdem generis as "no more than an aid to construction . . .
[that] comes into play only when there is some uncertainty as to the meaning of a particular clause in a statute." Id.
(citation omitted). Further after dividing the § 1961(4) definitional provision into two groups of enterprises, legitimate ones and ones associated in fact, the Court refused to regard one category as a more generalized description of the other, insisting that both were separate classifications. Id. at 581-82. The Court noted that within the second category standing alone, there existed no specific enumeration followed by a general description. Id. at 582. Therefore, e'usdem generis could not be applied. Id. Similarly, RICO's forfeiture provision not only establishes two categories by its language, but explicitly divides these two categories by separating § 1963(a) into (a)(1) and (a)(2). Using the Turkette Court's logic, there exists in subsection (a)(1)-analogous to the second category in Turkette-no specific enumeration followed by a more general description on which to predicate a case for application of ejusdem generis. 107 See supra text accompanying notes 78-80. The presumption that Congress omitted "in any enterprise" intentionally is consistent with the Court's approach in Turkette,
The debate over RICO's forfeiture language centers not only on the differences between the two subsections of Section 1963(a), but also on the differences between the language of Section 1963(a) as it now reads and the language of predecessor bills. An earlier draft of RICO, Senate Bill 1861, contained a single forfeiture provision limited to "all interest in the enterprise."' 108 After revision by the Judiciary Committee, however, the current two-part version, embodied in Section 1963(a)(1) and (a)(2), emerged.' 0 9 Courts favoring forfeiture of profits and proceeds have pointed to this revision as indicative of Congress' intent not to limit (a) (1) to interests "in an enterprise." 1 0
Of some importance as background to these legislative reworkings is a letter from then Deputy Attorney General Kleindienst to Congress that conveyed the Justice Department's view of the constitutionality of Senate Bill 1861, a RICO forerunner:
It is felt that this revival of the concept of forfeiture as a criminal pen-
alty, limited as it is in Section 1963(a) to one's interest in the enterprise which
is the subject of the specific offense involved here, and not extending to any other property of the convicted offender, is a matter of Congressional wisdom rather than of constitutional power .... "I Although the Kleindienst letter arguably is of some probative weight, 1 2 the Russello Court was justified in rejecting it as persuasive with respect to Section 1963's construction. The Kleindienst wherein it similarly presumed that Congress intended a broad reach to a RICO "enterprise" where the statute did not specify "legitimate" enterprises: "Had Congress not intended to reach criminal associations, it could easily have narrowed the sweep of the definition by inserting a single word, 'legitimate.'" Turkette, 452 U.S. at 581. The argument that Congress "would have said so," however, can cut both ways. See, e.g If Section 1963(a)(1) is to be viewed as independent of an "enterprise" limitation, whether imposed by Section 1963(a)(2)'s "in any enterprise" language or by reference to the racketeering activities barred by Section 1962,114 then some meaning must be ascribed the term "interest." As already noted," 15 The lower court attributed the letter to Congress' concern over "entering new territory," especially with respect to the constitutionality of the in personam criminal forfeiture sanction. Martino, 681 F.2d at 959. For further discussion of in personam criminal forfeitures, see infra notes 131-37 and accompanying text. The government also argued that it was unreasonable to interpret the letter as implying any constitutional problems should Congress mandate forfeiture of interests other than those in an enterprise, inasmuch as the objections that had been raised by some Congressmen had assumed that the authorized forfeiture would extend beyond interests involved in the RICO violation. Brief for the United States at 46-47, Russello. The government explained that forfeiture of racketeering profits derived directly from illegal activity was not subject to the same objection that opponents had erected as to forfeiture of an interest in a legitimate business. Id. at 47. 114 The Supreme Court rejected Petitioner's contention in Russello that the substantive prohibitions in § 1962 limited the nature of the interests forfeitable under § 1963. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text. For a discussion of a variety of opinions on how RICO's provisions interrelate, see infra notes 138-64 and accompanying text. 115 See supra note 15 and text accompanying note 66. 116 Although the term "interest" is not defined in RICO, § 1964(a) does confer jurisdiction on district courts to, inter alia, divest a defendant of "any interest, direct or indirect, in any enterprise," as a civil remedy. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982) . Section 1964's language raises its own questions. What do the modifiers "direct or indirect" add to the meaning of "interest," or "interest in any enterprise"? What constitutes an indirect interest, or an indirect interest in any enterprise? Should "direct or indirect" be read into the term "interest" when it is used in other RICO provisions? Is it significant that the "direct or indirect" interest language appears in the civil remedies provision ( § 1964) and not in the criminal penalties provision ( § 1963)? Compare this adjectival use of applying that term. Whether a court looks to dictionary definitions, 1 17 relevant treatises, 1 18 or case law from other areas, 119 the term "interest" ordinarily conveys a comprehensive scope.' 20 Additionally, as the Supreme Court recognized, RICO employs a "direct or indirect" to other adverbial uses appearing in RICO: "unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity ... to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise" ( § 1962(a)) (emphasis supplied); "unlawful ... through a pattern of racketeering activity ... to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise" ( § 1962(b) ) (emphasis supplied); "unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise ... to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity" ( § 1962(c)) (emphasis supplied). Given RICO's intentionally broad substantive reach as evidenced by § 1962's repeated refrain of "directly or indirectly," should the meaning of "any interest, direct or indirect" be given an equally broad interpretation?
Section 1964 provides further that district courts have broad injunctive and equitable powers ( § 1964(a)), that the Attorney General may institute proceedings under the section ( § 1964(b) ), that persons injured in business or property may sue and recover treble damages, costs, and attorneys' fees ( § 1964(c)), and that a final criminal judgment against a RICO defendant estops the defendant from denying essential allegations of the criminal offense in subsequent civil proceedings brought by the United States 118 The government cited a number of treatises on property favoring a broad reading of the term "interest." See Brief for the United States at 13-14, 18, Russello (citing, inter alia, RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 5 (1936) ("interest" denotes any "rights, privileges, powers and immunities" respecting land or other things); id at § 5 comment a ("no corresponding term in common use" manifests a similar scope)).
119 The Supreme Court in Russello referred to several of its due process decisions in divining the meaning of "interest." See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
120 Contra United States v. Meyers, 432 F. Supp. 456, 461 (W.D. Pa. 1977) . See supra note 32. See also United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 142 (N.D. Ga. 1979 ) (quoting Meyers); Joint Appendix, Martino panel opinion on forfeiture, supra note 29, at 65 (quoting Meyers). The government, noting that neither Meyers nor Thevis had cited authority for the definition of "interest," characterized the Meyers approach as "artificially narrow." Brief for the United States at 17 n.4, Russello. The government opined that even if the Meyers court had arrived at one acceptable definition, a court "engaging in statutory interpretation need not adopt the narrowest possible meaning of a plain and ordinary word," id. (citing Turkette, 452 U.S. at 587 n.10), but should give the words their" 'fair meaning in accord with the manifest intent of the lawmakers,'" id. (quoting United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 26 (1948) ). Finally, the government contended that an "interest" need not connote something less than sole ownership, citing a sole proprietorship, a fee simple absolute interest in real estate, and ownership of personal property, among others, as examples of "interests" entailing sole ownership. Id. at 18. number of other broad terms.' 2 ' B.
SHOULD RICO BE READ BROADLY OR NARROWLY?
The Russello Court skirted a question that has caused some disagreement among lower courts and that may bear on any exercise in interpreting RICO's language: whether RICO's criminal provisions should be read broadly or narrowly. RICO can be read as a sweeping attack on the problem of organized crime, relying on broad terminology to implement that attack. The final version of RICO, the product of extensive congressional consideration, 2 2 does not manifest a limited scope. ' 23 The drafters of RICO purposely introduced new concepts and new substantive offenses that are independent of traditional areas of federal legislation such as antitrust. 24 The statute employs broad terms and avoids painstaking enumeration. [RICO] suggests a congressional intent to limit its coverage"). 124 The substantive offenses employ at least two concepts new to the federal criminal law, the "pattern of racketeering activity" and the "enterprise." Taylor, supra note 34, at 386. Early legislative efforts had explored antitrust theories as possible avenues of attack on organized crime, focusing on, for example, the use of unreported income from one line of business in another line of business, investment of proceeds of criminal activity in a business enterprise, and anticompetitive effects in general. Blakey, supra note 15, at 253-56 & nn.48-53. The Antitrust Law Section of the American Bar Association specifically recommended that RICO-type legislation be enacted independent of extant antitrust legislation, such as the Sherman Act, due in part to unnecessary obstacles that reliance on antitrust jurisprudence might pose. See 115 CONG. REC. 6994-95 (report of ABA); Blakey, supra note 15, at 254-56 & nn.51-53. Professor Blakey has asserted that RICO does not resemble a traditional criminal statute because "its violation depends on the commission of at least two acts that violate independent criminal statutes; it does not 'draw a line' between innocent and criminal conduct. . . . That line is drawn by the offenses that constitute the 'racketeering activity' of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) . I..." Id. at 243 n.20 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). The novelty of RICO's forfeiture approach was underscored by the Justice Department's initial deferral in commenting on the provision: " [W] e are in accord with its objectives. However, because it is so innovative we have been unable to explore all the ramifications of the proposal .. " Senate Hearings, supra note 111, at 66 (prepared statement for U.S. Dep't ofJustice).
125 The Russello Court noted the statute's use of terms of breadth other than "interest," including "enterprise," "racketeering activity," and "participate." See supra text Finally, the drafters of RICO expressly provided that the legislation "be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes."' 126 All accompanying note 71. The government in Russello additionally attempted to examine the legislative choice of the term "interest" in light of other options:
Congress's only alternative to the use of the term "interest" would have been a painstaking enumeration of the specific things subject to forfeiture. This is the approach taken in some of the bills recently introduced in Congress to reverse Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 439 n.12 (2d Cir. 1974 ), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975 .
Some courts, however, have declined to apply RICO's provisions broadly, at least in a criminal context. In Thevis, for example, the district court, in holding the scope of § 1963 (a)(1) to be limited to interests in an enterprise, counseled that the liberal construction mandate must be ignored when the statute to be interpreted proscribes certain activities or provides for forfeiture of interests acquired or maintained in violation of the proscribed activities. . . . To do otherwise and allow a broad, expansive construction of 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) is to invite serious due process problems under the Fifth Amendment. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. at 142 (citation and footnote omitted). The district court added, "A liberal construction of 'interest' would foment these constitutional confrontations." Id. at 142 n.13. Some commentators also have advocated limiting the application of the liberal construction clause. See Bradley, supra note 57, at 860 n.126 (positing application of liberal construction clause to remedial civil portions only); Taylor, supra note 34, at 389 (courts should construe RICO forfeiture provisions strictly against the government despite liberal construction clause because of due process, vagueness, and disproportionality considerations). Nevertheless, most courts have applied the liberal these factors support an expansive reading of RICO.
There are considerations, however, that might militate against a broad reading of a federal criminal statute in general and RICO's in personam criminal forfeiture provision in particular. First, the "rule of lenity" might play a role in the interpretation of RICO's provisions. The rule of lenity is a general principle of statutory construction that, in cases of ambiguity, favors strictly construing criminal statutes against the government. 127 Because the Russello Court found RICO's forfeiture language to be clear and unambiguous, the Court never addressed squarely the possibly antagonistic roles of the rule of lenity and RICO's liberal construction clause in the interpretation of RICO's provisions.' 28 Nevertheless, the Court seems to have correctly denied weight to the rule of lenity in the context of RICO because the interests that the rule of lenity seeks to promote 2 9 are not endangered by a broad reading of RICO.' 3 0 construction clause generally to RICO's criminal as well as civil provisions. See Weiner, supra note 15, at 236 n.43. On another level, Blakey has noted and harshly criticized the fact that the ABA House of Delegates, at the urging of the Section on Criminal Justice, adopted a recommendation that the liberal construction clause be repealed for both criminal and civil proceedings. See Blakey, supra note 15, at 246 n.25. 127 Although not supporting its application to RICO, Blakey discusses the rule of lenity at length. He provides a useful definition of the principle: "The rule of lenity is a rule of construction that says that the interpretation more favorable to the defendant ought to be adopted when the text of the statute or its legislative history cannot be used to resolve an ambiguity according to congressional intent." Blakey, supra note 15, at 290 n. 150 (citation omitted). On its rationale: "The modern rule of lenity is rooted in two policies: the principle that fair warning of criminality ought to be given, and the related principle that the moral condemnation of criminality should be based on a legislative, not a judicial determination." Id. at 245 n.25 (citing Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 113 (1979); United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 347-48 (1971) ). The rule generally is not seen as constitutionally based, but rather as a nonconstitutional rule of statutory interpretation. See, e.g., United States v. Rewis, 401 U.S. 808, 811 n.5 (1971); Blakey, supra note 15, at 290 n. 150. Indeed, most states have abandoned the common law rule of strict construction in favor of, for example, "fair import" or "liberal" construction. See id. at 246-47 n.25 (collecting statutes). For a general discussion of the difference between liberal and strict interpretation, see 2A N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONsTRUcTION § 58.02 (revised 4th ed. 1984) .
128 See supra note 99 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court advised in Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 596 (1961) , and repeated in Turkette, 452 U.S. at 587 n.10, that the rule of lenity is not to be used to create an ambiguity where none exists. Interestingly, although the Court refused to apply the rule of lenity in Russello because it found the statutory language clear, it nevertheless drew on the liberal construction clause as a persuasive indication of Congress' broad purpose in enacting RICO. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. The en banc Fifth Circuit in Martino also declined to find a conflict between the rule of lenity and the liberal construction clause. See supra note 44. That court, however, refused to invoke either of those interpretive aids because, in its opinion, no ambiguity existed. Id. 129 See supra note 127 for identification of the two basic rationales for the rule of lenity.
130 As to the "fair warning" component, it is clear that illegal profits are potentially Some lower courts have strictly construed RICO's forfeiture provision because of its in personam nature. 131 These courts have viewed such in personam forfeitures as suspect because of a long history, extending back to England, of disfavor for in personam forfeitures. 1 3 2 The Supreme Court in Russello briefly mentioned the subject to disgorgement. If nothing else, § 1964(c) authorizes injured persons to recover treble damages, costs, and attorney's fees as a civil remedy. See supra note 116 ( § 1964) . Blakey reasons that any due process considerations are met when liberal construction is mandated by the legislature. Blakey, supra note 15, at 290 n.150. On a different tack, he argues that imposing the rule of lenity on RICO generally would present a double application of that principle (and double "fair warning") because the rule presumably is relied upon to the extent appropriate in construing the predicate offenses underlying RICO "racketeering activity." Id. at 245-46 n.25. Finally, the legislative enunciation of opprobrium for a wide range of racketeering activities in RICO is quite evident in its substantive provisions and in its liberal construction clause. Cf. United States v. Moore, 423 U. S. 122, 145 (1975) (" 'The canon in favor of strict construction is not an inexorable command to override common sense and evident statutory purpose.' ") (quoting United States v. Brown, 333 U. S. 18, 25-26 (1948) ). See also Turkette, 452 U.S. at 588 n.10.
131 A RICO forfeiture is in personam in that it acts "against a person involving his personal rights and based on jurisdiction of his person, as distinguished from a judgment against property [in rem]," BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 711 (5th ed. 1979), and it occurs only upon the defendant's conviction, see Taylor, supra note 34, at 380. The Justice Department delineated the salient distinctions between in personam and in rem forfeiture:
The concept of forfeiture as a criminal penalty which is embodied in this provision differs from other presently existing forfeiture provisions under Federal statutes where the proceeding is in rem against the property and the thing which is declared unlawful under the statute, or which is used for an unlawful purpose, or in connection with the prohibited property or transaction, is considered the offender, and the forfeiture is no part of the punishment for the criminal offense.
Under the criminal forfeiture of section 1963, however, the proceeding is in personam against the defendant who is the party to be punished upon conviction of violation of any provision of the section, not only by fine and/or imprisonment, but also by forfeiture of all interest in the enterprise. S. REP. No. 617, supra note 112, at 79-80 (prepared statement for U.S. Dep't ofJustice). Several courts have noted, however, that there exists no substantial difference in practice between RICO's in personam forfeiture and in rem forfeitures, at least where the RICO forfeiture is limited to interests or property put to an illegal use under § 1962.
See, e.g., United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1039 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 830 (1980); United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 397 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 141 n.10 (N.D. Ga. 1979) . In Russello, the defendant's forfeited insurance proceeds had not, strictly speaking, been put to an illegal use (although arguably the insurance policy had so been), but rather had been acquired through illegal means. See Russello, 104 S. Ct. at 298.
132 See, e.g., McManigal, 708 F.2d Notwithstanding the recitation by lower courts of society's historical abhorrence of forfeitures, Congress in recent years has relied increasingly upon the vehicle of in personam forfeitures, specifically forfeitures of profits, in its legislation against criminal activity. 1 34 This recent experience is reflected in the RICO statute, which the Russello Court read as congressional authorization of the forfeiture of such illegally obtained monetary "interests."' ' 35 Assuming the ultimate constitutionality of such in personam forfeitures, 3 6 therefore, it seems reasonable to eschew, as the Russello Court did implicitly, limiting the construction of the property acquired, maintained, or utilized in the conduct proscribed by 18 U.S.C. § 1962 reflects, no doubt, our society's traditional concern for the sanctity of private property afforded under both our Constitution and our system of economic development.").
The Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 397 (2d Cir. 1979) . 133 Russello, 104 S. Ct. at 299. The Court noted, "He [petitioner] rests his argument upon the propositions that criminal forfeitures are disfavored in law and that forfeiture statutes, as a consequence, must be strictly construed." Id. The Russello Court never directly discussed this particular issue in the case. 134 The government in Russello, for instance, identified three other major statutes that authorize the forfeiture of money used in or derived from unlawful activities in the contexts of illegal gambling businesses, 18 U.S.C. § 1955(d) (1982) , continuing criminal enterprises, 21 U.S.C. § 848(a)(2) (1982), and controlled substances violations, 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (1982) . Brief for the United States at 12, Russello. A number of states also have passed RICO-type legislation, most providing for forfeiture of money and property as well. See Brief of Petitioner at 8-9, Russello (collecting statutes); Blakey, supra note 15, at 237-38 n.3 (collecting statutes). The government in Russello concluded:
Whatever truth there may have been to this maxim ["society abhors forfeitures"] in the past, it is plain that over the last 15 years Congress has come increasingly to view forfeitures as an essential weapon in the battle against crime. It would therefore be more apt today to say that forfeitures are a preferred means of combatting criminal activity. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 397 (2d Cir. 1979 ), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980 . Section 1963(a)(1) forfeiture provision based on vaguely'defined, nonconstitutionally based presumptions concerning the inherent "badness" of extracting ill-gotten gains from convicted criminals. 1 3 7
C. RICO'S STRUCTURAL CONGRUITY-HOW IT ALL FITS
A key consideration in statutory interpretation concerns whether the result of the process of interpretation is consistent with the statutory scheme. 13 8 The Supreme Court, for example, holding in United States v. Turkette 1 3 9 that a RICO "enterprise" encompassed both legitimate enterprises and illegitimate associations in fact, examined the effect that its interpretation of the term "enterprise" would work on RICO's statutory scheme. 140 The Court concluded in Turkette that broadly interpreting the term "enterprise" to apply to criminal organizations would neither "render any portion of the statute superfluous nor . . create any structural incongruities within the framework of the Act."'
The Russello Court engaged in a similar analysis and concluded that an expansive reading of "interest" in Section 1963(a)(1) would not render Section 1963(a)(2) "mere surplusage."' ' 4 2 The Court adopted the government's position that Subsection (a)(2) was distinguishable from (a) (1) in that an (a) (2) interest in the enterprise need not be illegally acquired, whereas an (a)(1) interest must be "acquired or maintained in violation of section 1962." 14 3 The Russello Court concluded that there did exist "things forfeitable under one, but not the other, of each of the subsections."' 14 4
The Supreme Court's approach in Russello stands in sharp contrast with what had been the position of a number of lower courts. Because the term "interest" in Section 1963 is not defined, most 137 At oral argument in Russello, Assistant to the Solicitor General Alito commented that it was farfetched to suggest that Congress had entertained unexpressed doubts regarding the constitutionality of forfeiture of proceeds under RICO because, among other things, it obviously had enacted the provision, manifesting no "abhorrence." 34 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 4038, 4039 (Oct. 12, 1983) .
138 See Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580 ("internal inconsistencies in the statute must be dealt with") (citation omitted [T]he employment of that term ("interest"] establishes additional limits for the forfeiture mandated under § 1963(a)(1). Curiously, the term "interest" is not defined by RICO, but as employed in 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a), it derives its meaning from the activities barred by § 1962.
18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1) is directed at an interest acquired or maintained "in violation of section 1962. " (emphasis added). The statutory concept on which 18 U.S.C. § 1962 rests is the "enterprise" concept; that is to say, it is the acquisition, maintenance, or participation in an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity that is proscribed under that section. Since it is the addition of the "enterprise" concept which distinguishes a RICO prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1962 from an ordinary prosecution directed at each of the individual predicated [sic] acts which constitute the pattern of racketeering activity, this Court is convinced that the "interest" subject to forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) is limited to the interest in the enterprise and does not extend to fruits or profits generated from the enterprise. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. at 142. In a post-Martino appellate opinion, the Seventh Circuit in McManigal expressed similar sentiments:
It is not really possible to determine the meaning of the word "interest" simply from reading Section 1963. Contra Martino, supra, . An examination of the substantive provisions in Section 1962 supports a narrow reading of the term "interest." Section 1962(a), for example, makes it illegal only to invest income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity. Though Congress obviously recognized that income and profits could be generated by a pattern of racketeering activity, it chose to criminalize only the investment of that income, except under the 1% investment exception, when the total investment is de minimis and thus would not grant the racketeer control over the business. The earning of illegal income itself is not prohibited under RICO. Rather the entire statutory scheme is based on the "enterprise" concept, and it is that concept which distinguishes a RICO prosecution from any other prosecution. Although the Fifth Circuit is technically correct when it says that the enterprise concept applies to a RICO prosecution under Section 1962, and not necessarily to the forfeiture provisions of Section 1963, Martino, supra, 681 F.2d at 955 and n. 15, it makes sense in construing the scope of the statute to read the prohibitory and penal sections in a similar way. McManigal, 146 For example, the McManigal court opined that "the forfeiture sanctions in Section 1963(a)(1) and (a)(2) were meant to apply to different types of illegal behavior under 1962 and 1963.147 Courts and commentators supporting the imposition of an enterprise element into the RICO forfeiture mechanism argued that such an interpretation provides meaning for all parts of Sections 1962 and 1963. Courts opposing an implied enterprise requirement argued that Section 1963(a)(1) would have no role independent of Section 1963 (a) (2) were an enterprise requirement to be read into (a)(1).14 8 In response, several courts espoused an "active-passive" or "control-no control" distinction between the two subsections: interests in an enterprise affording the defendant an active role, entailing control or influence over the enterprise, would be tainted money under Section 1962(a), and to interests in an enterprise acquired or maintained by racketeering activity under Section 1962(b). The forfeiture sanction in Section 1963(a)(2) is meant to apply to interests in an enterprise which is involved in conduct violative of Section 1962(c), as well as conduct violative of Section 1962(a) that does not involve "acquiring" or "maintaining" an interest in an enterprise. See Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 Ga. L. Rev. 291, 307-308 (1983) . § 1963(a) (1), being limited to interests in the enterprise and to individual members' interest in said enterprise, does not extend to profits or dividends which have been distributed and over which the enterprise has no control.
Id.
148 See, e.g., Martino, 681 F.2d at 955 ("reading an enterprise limitation into § 1963(a)(1) renders that section surplusage. . . . Section 1963(a)(1) would merely be duplicative of this provision [ § 1963(a) (2) reachable under Section 1963(a)(2); Subsection (a)(1), on the other hand, would extend to passive interests, involving no control or influence, where those interests were acquired or maintained in violation of Section 1962.1 49 Adherents to this theory contended that if an enterprise requirement were not read into Section 1963(a)(1), it would be Subsection (a)(2), and not (a)(1), that was rendered surplusage. 150 Simply put, this argument asserts that were (a)(1)'s use of the term "interest" to be broadly interpreted, (a)(2)'s phrasing of "interest in . . .any enterprise" would become in effect a "lesser included" of (a)(1).1 5 1 The Supreme Court in Russello, however, explicitly rejected this analysis as "plainly incorrect."
Notwithstanding the lower court case law to the contrary, several justifications exist to support the Supreme Court's rejection in Russello of an implied enterprise requirement in Section 1963(a)(1). First, the Russello Court's framework is more consistent with the different roles a RICO enterprise may assume. The fact that a RICO enterprise may take a variety of forms 1 53 occasions also a variety of roles that an enterprise may play in a RICO violation. Professor Blakey has identified four categories that may aid analysis: prize, instrument, victim, and perpetrator. 5 4 He suggests that the reme- 149 See, e.g., McManigal, 708 F.2d at 287; Martino, 681 F.2d 153 The Supreme Court has recognized that a RICO "enterprise" encompasses both legitimate and wholly illegitmate organizations. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580; see also Russello, 104 S. Ct. at 301 (citing Turkette) . Blakey has commented on the range of organizations that may constitute a RICO enterprise:
The concept of "enterprise" may be divided into four broad categories: (1) commercial entities (e.g. corporations, partnerships, sole proprietorships); (2) benevolent organizations (e.g. unions, benefit funds, schools); (3) governmental units (e.g. the office of a governor, a state legislator, a court, a prosecutor's office, a police or sheriff's department, or an executive department or agency); or (4) associations in fact (licit or illicit). The categories are not mutually exclusive. Blakey, supra note 15, at 290-300 (footnotes omitted).
154 Blakey, supra note 15, at 306-07. He explains his categorization: Since RICO's standards make "unlawful" certain investments, acquisitions or conduct in connection with an "enterprises," [sic] the roles that the enterprise may play in a violation of these standards may be variously-but not mutually exclusivelydescribed as "prize," "instrument," "victim," or "perpetrator." A violation involving an unlawful investment will usually cast the enterprise in the role of a "prize." Typically, a violation involving an unlawful acquisition will find the enterprise in the role of "prize" or "victim." Violations involving the operation of an enterprise by a pattern of racketeering activity may find the enterprise in the role of an "instrument, victim," or "perpetrator." dial purpose, both civil and criminal, underlying the prosecution of a RICO violation may vary with the function of the enterprise in a particular scheme. 155 In the RICO criminal forfeiture setting, reading an implicit enterprise requirement into Section 1963 does not accommodate adequately the statutory remedial purpose of forfeiture where the RICO enterprise serves not as a prize or victim, but as an instrument or perpetrator. As the Court in Russello recognized, 5 6 such a construction allows no room for forfeiture of interests in the context of an illicit association in fact, which inevitably will be cast in the role of "perpetrator."' 15 7 The apparent singlemindedness of these lower courts in envisioning a RICO enterprise for forfeiture purposes only in terms of a prize or victim is underscored initially by their focus on "invested" interests and their consequent dismissal of the problems faced in forfeiting interests "in the enterprise" in the case of associations in fact. 158 This conceptual tunnel vision is evidenced secondly by the emphasis of these courts on the prevention of infiltration of legitimate business as Congress' goal in enacting RICO, to the exclusion of the goal of reaching organized crime's ill-gotten gains.' 59 A second justification for Russello's rejection of an enterprise element in Section 1963(a)(1) is that although Section 1963 dearly employs Section 1962 as a referent, 60 any limiting relationship beId. at 306-09 (footnotes omitted). Blakey presents these categories in the context of an analysis of the application of RICO's substantive liability provisions. They may nevertheless be of help here in examining the role of the enterprise with respect to RICO's remedial provisions.
155 Id. at 323 (footnote omitted). Blakey provides the following illustrative application:
Where an enterprise is a "prize" or "victim," no salutory remedial purpose would be served by attributing the conduct of an individual involved in the pattern of racketeering activity to the individual or entity playing the role of the enterprise, whether for civil liability or criminal responsibility. Indeed, doing so would undermine the purpose of the Act. On the other hand, the remedial purpose of the statute would be enhanced by such an attribution where the individual or entity was playing the role of "perpetrator."... A more difficult issue, however, is presented by the role of "instrument." The enterprise is used in the unlawful conduct, but it is not its author in the same sense as when the enterprise is the "perpetrator." Nonetheless, it is not wholly innocent, as when it plays the role of purely a "prize" or "victim.". . . On balance, the remedial purposes of RICO tip the judgment toward finding civil liability, but not criminal responsibility for the enterprise when its role is purely that of "instrument. 161 Martino, 681 F.2d at 955 (footnote omitted). The court of appeals elaborated its view in a footnote: "That the enterprise concept is the overriding concept in RICO, distinguishing a RICO prosecution from an ordinary prosecution for the predicate acts of racketeering, does not necessarily mean that the enterprise concept is also a limitation on the type of property interests subject to forfeiture under § 1963(a)(1)." Id. at 955 n. 15 (emphasis in original).
162 Id. at 955. See also Brief for the United States at 27 n.9, Russello (limiting § 1963(a) (1) 164 Section 1962(a)'s "1% investment exception" essentially provides that purchases of securities for investment purposes aggregating less than one per cent of the issuer's outstanding securities are exempt from § 1962(a) liability. See supra note 15 (text § 1962) . The Ninth Circuit in Marubeni assigned significant weight to this language, reasoning that "[Clongress would not have established rules for the investment of racketeering income, enforced by the penalty of criminal forfeiture, if it intended the government to seize that income regardless of how it was used. " Marubeni, 611 F.2d REC. 972, 25,192 (1970) . The House, after minor amendments, passed the legislation by a 431 to 26 margin. See id. at 35,363. The Senate later accepted the House amendments on a voice vote. See id. at 36,296.
166 The most obvious limitation is that the statutory language, not the legislative history, is the "law of the land." Martino, 681 F.2d at 958 n.22. As to the role of RICO's legislative history generally, see Note, supra note 34. For a discussion of the problems faced in employing legislative history to determine the purpose of a legislature in enacting a particular statute, see Bennett, "Mere" Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and Democratic Theory, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1049 , 1071 -77 (1979 . Finally, Congress clearly "cannot be expected to specifically address each issue of statutory construction that may arise." Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 341 (1981) .
167 Pub. L. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970) This review of the legislative history of S. 30 in general, and Title IX in particular, establishes the following points beyond serious question:
(1) Congress fully intended, after specific debate, to have RICO apply beyond any limiting concept like "organized crime" or "racketeering";
(2) Congress deliberately redrafted RICO outside of the antitrust statutes, so that it would not be limited by antitrust concepts like "competitive," "commercial," or "direct or indirect" injury; (3) Both immediate victims of racketeering activity and competing organizations were contemplated as civil plaintiffs for injunction, damage, and other relief; (4) Over specific objections raising issues of federal-state relations and crowded court dockets, Congress deliberately extended RICO to the general field of commercial and other fraud; and (5) Congress was well aware that it was creating important new federal criminal and civil remedies in a field traditionally occupied by common law fraud. Id. at 280 (emphasis in original). 169 Several commentators noted at the time of RICO's passage that the reach of RICO's predicate offenses encompassed significantly more than would ordinarily be considered "organized crime. " See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on theJudiciaty, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. at 185 (during testimony of Attorney General Mitchell). One commentator has stated that RICO must necessarily catch much ordinary white collar crime, for instance, as incidental to an effective attack on organized crime. See Weiner, supra note 15, at 228 n.13.
The breadth of RICO's application has engendered concern in some circles that RICO charges may unjustly tarnish defendants' reputations. See, e.g., 1982 A.B The more expansive interpretation of RICO is the more persuasive. First, those statements of RICO drafters and legislators speaking to forfeiture of organized crime's "ill-gotten gains," and those speaking to forfeiture of the racketeer's "interest in the enterprise," are not mutually exclusive. 17 7 Second, the broader construction attacks organized crime's infiltration of legitimate business at its source, the economic power of the racketeer, and therefore satisfies both RICO's remedial and preventive purposes. 178 Finally, even if the prevention of infiltration was the single goal of Congress in enacting RICO, that congressional concern with infiltration arguably might extend to organized crime's control and infiltration of illegitimate enterprises as well. we should blind ourselves to other forms of racketeering which Congress also declared to be the object of its concern"); Weiner, supra note 15, at 240 ("Although there are statements in the legislative history that indicate that forfeiture applies to a defendant's interest in the RICO enterprise itself there is no statement that precludes the forfeiture of other types of 'interests,' including money.") (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). 178 The Turkette Court focused on organized crime's use of its illicit revenues "as a springboard into the sphere of legitimate enterprise." 452 U.S. at 591 (citation omitted). The Court further stressed both the remedial and the preventive functions of RICO, requiring "some positive sign that the law was not to reach organized criminal activities that gave rise to the concerns about infiltration." Id. at 593. See also Martino, 681 F.2d at 957 ("Section 1963(a) launches a two-pronged attack on the sources of economic power which feed the coffers and activities of organized crime. It demands both divestiture of power over the enterprise itself and seizure of the income derived from racketeering activities.") (footnote omitted); United States v. Frnmento, 563 F.2d 1083 , 1090 (3d Cir. 1977 ) (Congress was concerned with reducing invidious capabilities of organized crime to infiltrate American economy), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 1072 (1978) .
179 See, e.g., Turkette, 452 U.S. at 584-85 ("It is obvious that § § 1962(a) and (b) address the infiltration by organized crime of legitimate businesses, but we cannot agree that these sections were not also aimed at preventing racketeers from investing or reinvesting in wholly illegal enterprises and from acquiring through a pattern of racketeering activity wholly illegitimate enterprises such as an illegal gambling business or a loan-sharking operation."); Noonan v. Granville-Smith, 537 F. Supp. 23, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 198 1) (RICO deals with organized crime's control over business enterprises of all sorts, whether legitimate or illegitimate); United States v. Castellano, 416 F. Supp. 125, 128 (E.D.N.Y. 1975 ) (RICO purpose extends to infiltration of racketeering funds into illegitimate business as well as legitimate ones).
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its and proceeds of racketeering activity potentially impacts on RICO's reach, operation, and constitutionality. Initially, one question centers on how far a Section 1963(a)(1) forfeiture can extend: what else is forfeitable besides the insurance proceeds at issue in Russello, in light of the fact that the Supreme Court declined to offer help in defining "profits" and "proceeds"?1 8 0
Given the Court's broad language in its discussion of the term "interest,"' 8 '1 and the variety of possible applications of RICO's provisions,' 8 2 the federal district courts can expect to address this issue in the near future.' 8 3
Russello's expansive construction of RICO's forfeiture language also may affect the handling of a RICO prosecution. Initially, the broader reading will "raise the stakes" generally because much more potentially will be forfeitable in any given RICO criminal prosecution. 8 4 One obvious side effect of greater potential criminal liability will be to provide the government more opportunity for plea bargaining with potential RICO defendants.' 8 5 Greater criminal liability also may affect more directly specific procedural protections.' 8 6 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7, for instance, requires the indictment to allege the extent of the interest or property subject to forfeiture.' 8 7 Russello conceivably could affect this requirement in several ways. Courts may require a greater degree of specificity in the indictment to reflect the greater risk facing the the basic principles governing the granting of equitable provisional remedies, it will clearly enhance the significance, both for the government and for the defendant, of such actions.
V. CONCLUSION The Supreme Court's decision in Russello represents a recognition of RICO's expansive scope, continuing the Court's broad approach to interpreting RICO that was first exhibited in Turkette. Russello is not a surprising decision, despite the body of lower court case law holding that RICO's forfeiture mechanism does not encompass proceeds or profits of racketeering activity. The Court is cororder does not in itself violate due process, see United States v. Bello, 470 F. Supp. 723, 724-25 (S.D. Cal. 1979 ) (issuance of restraining order relating to assets subject to RICO forfeiture did not constitute pretrial determination of guilt and did not deny defendant due process); United States v. Scalzitti, 408 F. Supp. 1014 , 1015 (W.D. Pa. 1975 ) (restraining order on assets subject to potential RICO forfeiture did not deprive defendant of presumption of innocence), courts may exercise considerable caution in employing a restraining order in the context of RICO criminal forfeiture. This judicial caution may be manifested in two ways. First, courts may require a prompt, post-order, seizure hearing. See, e.g., United States v. Spilotro, 680 F.2d 612, 617-18 (9th Cir. 1982 ) (recognizing importance of affording prompt hearing once restraining order is issued, government could not wait until trial to produce adequate grounds for forfeiture to justify restraining order on encumbrance of corporate assets); see generally Comment, Criminal Forfeiture and the Necessity for a Post-Seizure Hearing: Are CCE and RICO Rackets for the Government?, 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 776 (1983) . Contra Blakey, supra note 15, at 316 n.176 (criticizing Spilotro as converting a § 1963(b) hearing into a mini-trial, causing unnecessary delay and unwisely affording criminal defendants pretrial discovery). Blakey argues that the indictment itself may be considered sufficient probable cause on the question of criminal responsibility to justify a restraining order. Id. at 315 n. 176. He would limit the court to the issue of the "proper terms" of the order. Id. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963 See 18 U.S.C. § (b) (1982 . He continues:
RICO grants broad equitable powers. . . . In light of its liberal construction clause and its legislative history, it ought to be held to authorize temporary restraining orders, preliminary injunctions, receiverships, and the full range of ultimate equity relief on the request of the government or private parties, and because the source of the jurisdiction is statutory, restrictive precedent ought not be held to narrow the ability of the court to do justice. Id. at 338 n.217 (citations omitted).
Further evidence of judicial caution is reflected in the heavy burden imposed by some courts on the government to justify equitable action such as a restraining order. See, e.g., Spilotro, 680 F.2d 612, 618 (9th Cir. 1982 ) (government's burden in obtaining restraining order is to demonstrate that it is likely to convince jury beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant is guilty of racketeering and the properties are subject to forfeiture); United States v. Beckham, 562 F. Supp. 488, 490 (E.D. Mich. 1983 ) (issuance of restraining order requires proof by clear and convincing evidence that the properties were involved in the violation, that the properties would be subject to forfeiture, and government has reasonable grounds to believe defendant is likely to make properties inaccessible to government before end of trial); United States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237, 240-41 (E.D. Cal. 1982 ) (brief ex parte restraining order will be continued only if government establishes in adversary hearing by preponderance of the evidence that defendant is guilty and property subject to forfeiture). rect in interpreting Congress' use of differing language in Sections 1963(a)(1) and (a)(2) as attributable to something more than poor draftsmanship. Given RICO's broad purpose and its equally broad operative language, the Court was justified in ascribing an expansive construction to RICO's forfeiture provision. The Russello Court's reading of the forfeiture provision is consistent with RICO's legislative history and preserves the effectiveness of RICO's criminal sanctions. The decision does, however, raise some questions with respect to future application of the forfeiture provision. The Supreme Court's holding in Russello will require that lower courts address a number of related issues, such as what other types of property may constitute forfeitable "interests," the effect of greater potential criminal liability on existing procedural protections, the role of traditional restitutionary principles with respect to property subject to forfeiture, and the use of provisional equitable remedies. TIMOTHY A. ITA
